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NOTE
THIS LITTLE PIGGY CAUSED A NUISANCE:
ANALYZING NORTH CAROLINA’S 2018 AMENDMENT TO ITS
RIGHT-TO-FARM ACT
Ashley Pollard†
“Also if a person keeps his hogs, or other noisome animals, so near the house
of another that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air
unwholesome, this is an injurious nuisance, as it tends to deprive him of the
use and benefit of his house.”1
ABSTRACT
Hogs stink. It’s as simple as that. Because of this fact, North Carolina, along
with many other states, adopted a “right-to-farm” statute in the late 1970s.
These statutes were designed to protect farmers from being held liable for the
nuisances that their farms created. The need for the statutes was felt deeply in
the late 1970s and early 1980s as the suburbs began a hostile takeover of former
agricultural lands. The purpose of the laws was to prevent the farmers’ new
neighbors from suing them for the stench, or other nuisances, caused by their
farms.
In the summer of 2018, the North Carolina General Assembly passed an
amendment to the North Carolina Right-to-farm Statute. This amendment
substantially limited the circumstances under which a neighbor to a farm could
bring a nuisance action against a farming operation. This amendment came
during a summer of nuisance victories for hog farm neighbors. The legislature
considered these actions “frivolous” and began its work to amend the statute to
prevent similar actions from succeeding.2

† Submissions Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Vol. 14; B.A., 2017, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. Candidate, 2020, Liberty University School of Law. I would
like to thank my parents, David and Donna Pollard, for their constant love and support
throughout my life. I would not be where I am today without them. I would also like to thank
William Hurley for his support and encouragement throughout the writing process.
1. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217.
2. S.B. 711, N.C. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018).
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While the legislature had the best of intentions in attempting to further
shield farmers from nuisance liability, it missed the point being made in the
actions: factory-sized farms are damaging to property rights and human
health. It is this reasoning that the neighbors adopted in their arguments, and
it is this reasoning that has now won over several juries.
Because of the negative impact on both property rights and human health,
North Carolina lawmakers should revise the current statute to accommodate
the industry’s shift to factory-sized farming operations. Additionally, the North
Carolina courts should implement the use of pretrial hearings to determine
whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to certain plaintiffs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after Tom Butler began raising pigs at his Lillington, North
Carolina, farm, he received an upsetting call from his neighbor down the
road.3 This call brought the news that Butler’s neighbor, who lived two miles
from his farm, could smell his hogs in her home.4 This revelation greatly
troubled Butler and created a desire within him to change.5 “We don’t have
the right to make anyone suffer while we profit,” said Butler; “[i]f we can do
something to lessen the impact on our neighbors, then we should be doing
something.”6 And something is exactly what he did.
Since receiving this phone call, Butler has taken great steps in reducing the
impact, i.e., the smell, of his farm on his surrounding community.7 In
furtherance of this goal, Butler installed green tarps, made of a high-density
plastic, over his waste lagoons.8 These tarps began working immediately to
decrease the smell, but they also kept out rainwater to prevent spillage and
trapped the methane gas which emits from the waste as it decays.9 Through
the use of technology, which he has spent the past eight years researching and
developing, Butler is able to recycle the methane gas from his hogs’ waste to
provide energy for his farm and “up to 150 homes in Harnett County.”10

3. Billy Liggett, Power of Rural, CAMPBELL MAG., June 12, 2018, at 25.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 26.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Liggett, supra note 3, at 26.
10. Id. at 26–27.
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However, not all hog farmers adhere to Butler’s philosophy of lessening
the impact of his farm on his neighbors. These farmers adopt a farming
method by which they prevent the overflow of their waste lagoons by
spraying the waste as fertilizer on nearby fields.11 While this technique is
common, it has acute ramifications on public health.12 A 2016 report from
Duke University Medical Center found that “living near concentrated animal
feeding operations causes upper-respiratory problems, high blood pressure,
fatigue, depression and exposure to a number of carcinogens.”13 Despite the
negative impact that industrialized hog farms have on the community,
lawmakers continue to shield them from nuisance liability through right-tofarm acts. These statutes have not only failed to change with the increase of
factory-style farming operations but have also narrowed the circumstances
in which neighbors may hold farmers accountable for the nuisances that they
create.14
Allowing the right-to-farm to extend to concentrated animal feeding
operations will pose issues involving the property rights and the health of
farm neighbors. For these reasons, courts should institute a balancing test
through which they balance the interests of the property owners against the
legislative purpose of applying statutory immunity to farmers. Through this
balancing test, courts could achieve justice by finding the statute
unconstitutional as applied to certain plaintiffs.
II. BACKGROUND
Home to nearly 9 million hogs, the Tar Heel State is hog heaven, or
perhaps hog hell.15 North Carolina is the nation’s second largest hogproducer, trailing behind Iowa’s 22.6 million pigs.16 However, with many
hogs come many problems. Other than angry phone calls from neighbors,
the main issue that hog growers face is their potential nuisance liability.

11. Hog Farms & Hurricanes: A Primer on Lagoons and Flooding, N.C. PORK COUNCIL (Sept.
11, 2018), http://www.ncpork.org/primer/.
12. See infra note 34.
13. Liggett, supra note 3, at 28.
14. Cordon M. Smart, The “Right to Commit Nuisance” in North Carolina: A Historical
Analysis of the Right-to-Farm Act, 94 N.C. L. REV. 2097, 2116 (2016).
15. Liggett, supra note 3, at 30.
16. Id.
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What Is a Nuisance?

Before one can understand the “right-to-farm,” it is important to note
what that “right” protects farmers from, namely, private nuisance liability.17
Generally, a nuisance is the unreasonable interference with another’s use and
enjoyment of her land.18 Nuisance law is a court-developed doctrine that is
imbedded in the principle “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,” which means
“one must so use her property as not to injure that of another.”19 Essentially,
“[t]he law of nuisance provides that although each landowner has the general
right to make use of her land as she wishes, no landowner has the right to use
her land in a way that unreasonably interferes with her neighbors’ enjoyment
of their possessory rights in their land.”20
B.

Hog Farming in North Carolina: From Small Farms to CAFOs

In the dawn of the twentieth century, the agricultural industry employed
nearly half of the United States’ population.21 In addition to its employment
of a high percentage of the American workforce, the agricultural industry
supplied Americans with food. These two aspects of the industry proved
extremely important to America as a whole, and with the rise of suburban
America on the horizon, lawmakers saw fit to protect America’s farmers from
potential nuisance liability resulting from the encroaching urbanization.22
This protection came in the form of statutes known as “right-to-farm acts.”
Right-to-farm acts offer statutory immunity to farms from civil liability
arising from nuisance lawsuits. In the 1970s, former agricultural lands
became fraught with an influx of citizens, giving farmers neighbors that they
did not once have.23 The influx of people brought an influx of complaints
about the smells and noises coming from neighboring farms. These
complaints took the form of nuisance lawsuits, and farmers became liable for
the disturbance their operations caused their new neighbors. In the interest
of justice, our nation’s lawmakers took to drafting legislation to protect
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020).
18. R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, ET AL., Governmental Land Use Controls: Judicial Doctrines
and Legislative Regulation, in PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 822–24 (3d. ed. 2011).
19. Id. at 823.
20. Id.
21. DIMITRI ET AL., ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULL. NO. 3, THE
20TH CENTURY TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY, 2 (June 2005).
22. See Smart, supra note 14, at 2116.
23. Id.
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farmers from the increased urbanization which threatened to run them out
of business. As a result, the right-to-farm was born.
Since the 1970s, every state has enacted a right-to-farm act, each with
varying degrees of protection.24 The typical right-to-farm offers nuisance
immunity to farms that comply with state regulations. In recognition of the
right-to-farm’s history, the majority of states have limited nuisance
immunity to only allow immunity against neighbors that “came to the
nuisance.”25 This “coming to the nuisance” defense allows farmers the ability
to protect themselves from neighbors who moved into the agricultural lands
after the farm had occupied the land for a specified period of time.26
In recent years, America’s agricultural industry has experienced a shift
from traditional, small family farms to large-scale farms with corporate
contracts.27 North Carolina has not been exempted from this trend. In the
past few decades, North Carolina’s farm industry has seen a massive shift
toward large-scale farming and a decrease in the traditional family farm.28
Change in the industry, however, has not spurred change in policy. With the
decreasing number of family farms and the increasing number of “factory
farms,” states continue to protect farms from nuisance liability through rightto-farm acts, and industrial-sized farms, known popularly as CAFOs, hide
behind such protection.
1.

What Is a CAFO?

Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs”), popularly known
as “factory farms,” are particular types of Animal Feeding Operations
(“AFOs”) which meet certain regulatory criteria.29 To be considered a CAFO,
a farm must first be defined as an AFO.30 An AFO, as defined within the
Clean Water Act, is an agricultural operation which keeps and raises animals

24. CARRIE HRIBAR, UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND
THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 11, (Nat’l Ass’n of Loc. Boards of Health, 2010).
25. Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-ToFarm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 88 (2006).
26. See Smart, supra note 14, at 2117.
27. See ECON. RES. SERV., supra note 21 (charting the declining percentage of the labor force
employed in agriculture).
28. See Smart, supra note 14, at 2104.
29. See Hribar, supra note 24, at 1.
30. Id.
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in a confined situation.31 An AFO is a lot or facility where animals are stabled
or confined for forty-five days or more in a twelve-month period.32 A CAFO
is an “AFO with more than 1000 animal units . . . confined on site for more
than 45 days during the year.”33
CAFOs have economic benefits such as providing low cost meat and
promoting the local economy.34 However, these benefits come with costs: the
impact on public health through contamination of the air and water, horrible
odors, creation of insect vectors, exposure to pathogens, and the lowering of
property values in the surrounding area.35
2.

The Health Issues Arising from Current CAFO Farming
Methods

One of the major concerns about CAFOs is their impact on public health.
Farms and other agricultural operations are heavily regulated to mitigate the
damage to their surrounding environments. The Clean Water Act, for
example, places limits on a farm’s operations to ensure that it does not badly
pollute the groundwater and surrounding waterways.36 Pollution is especially
vexing in areas where most residents obtain their drinking water from private
wells, which can be contaminated and cause its drinkers to experience
diarrhea, vomiting, and nausea.37 The concern over water pollution is
magnified in eastern North Carolina, the home of many hog farms. The
magnification of pollution concerns is attributable to a method of waste
management adopted by hog farmers, the anaerobic lagoon system.

31. Id.
32. Animal Feeding Operations (AFOs), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/animal-feeding-operations-afos (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
DEP’T
OF
AGRIC.,
33. Animal
Feeding
Operations
(AFOs),
U.S.
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/plantsanimals/livestock/afo/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2018).
34. See Hribar, supra note 24, at 2.
35. Id. at 2–11.
36. See generally 33 U.S.C.A. § 1329 (2020).
37. Wynne Davis, Overflowing Hog Lagoons Raise Environmental Concerns in North
Carolina, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/22/650698240/hu
rricane-s-aftermath-floods-hog-lagoons-in-north-carolina.
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Anaerobic lagoons are deep, man-made ponds which store excrement. 38
These lagoons are often not lined, but rather are open-air, earthen basins.39
The typical depth of an anaerobic lagoon is eight feet or greater. 40 The waste
enters through the bottom of the lagoon and mixes with the “sludge” layer. 41
The lagoons are often a pink, Pepto-Bismol tint resulting from the bacteria
in the mixture.42 After a specified period of time, which varies from lagoon to
lagoon, the now-liquid waste is applied as a fertilizer on nearby fields through
the use of sprayers.43
While the obvious issue these lagoons raise would be the potential for
water pollution, the Act has graciously provided that it shall not affect or
defeat the right of potential plaintiffs to recover for injuries or damages
resulting from water pollution.44 This provision, however, does not preserve
claims for injuries or damages resulting from air pollution or illness caused
by airborne bacteria emanating from the lagoons. As noted in the previous
section, researchers have attributed a variety of illnesses and even higher
mortality rates to living in close proximity to hog farm operations.45
While these health issues could be resolved through enacting more
restrictive regulations on the farms, an alternative to enacting further
legislation would be to permit nuisance lawsuits under certain circumstances.
This alternative is useful because statutory enforcement actions are often

38. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WASTEWATER TECHNOLOGY FACT SHEET: ANAEROBIC
LAGOONS (Sept. 2002).
39. Id.; see Emily Moon, North Carolina’s Hog Waste Problem Has A Long History. Why
Wasn’t It Solved In Time For Hurricane Florence?, PACIFIC STANDARD (Sept. 14, 2018)
https://psmag.com/environment/why-wasnt-north-carolinas-hog-waste-problem-solvedbefore-hurricane-florence) (explaining some newer pits are now lined with clay).
40. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WASTEWATER TECHNOLOGY FACT SHEET: ANAEROBIC
LAGOONS (Sept. 2002).
41. Id.
42. Wynne Davis, Overflowing Hog Lagoons Raise Environmental Concerns in North
Carolina, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 22, 2018, 07:54 p.m.), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/22/65
0698240/hurricane-s-aftermath-floods-hog-lagoons-in-north-carolina.
43. Hog Farms & Hurricanes: A Primer on Lagoons and Flooding, N.C. PORK COUNCIL (Sept.
11, 2018), http://www.ncpork.org/primer/.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(c) (2020).
45. Julia Kravchenko et. al., Mortality and Health Outcomes in North Carolina
Communities Located in Close Proximity to Hog Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 79
N.C. MED. J., NO. 5, 278 (2018).
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difficult and expensive.46 Additionally, successful enforcement actions will
not provide plaintiffs with the proper remedies and compensation for their
injuries and damages.47
C.

The Cases Against Murphy-Brown, LLC

In 2013, 479 plaintiffs filed twenty-five cases in the Superior Court of
Wake County, North Carolina against Smithfield Foods, Inc., MurphyBrown, LLC, and several individual growers in eastern North Carolina.48
These suits alleged nuisance and negligence claims against approximately
ninety hog farms.49 In August 2014, 515 plaintiffs filed approximately twentyfive cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina; these claims were filed exclusively against Murphy-Brown.50
The plaintiffs in the first decided case, McKiver v. Murphy Brown, LLC,
consisted of ten neighbors who lived near a hog farm that housed nearly
15,000 hogs.51 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged several injuries to the
use and enjoyment of their property, such as the heavy stench that was
impossible to remove from their clothing, the swarms of flies that terrorized
their yards, and the increased noise from the farm’s trucks.52 During trial, the
plaintiffs focused on the anaerobic lagoons53 used by the farms to store hog
waste until the waste could be liquefied and sprayed onto nearby fields.54

46. Andrew C. Hanson, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and the Common Law:
Fixing Wrongs Committed Under the Right-to-farm, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES
FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 287 (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini eds., 2007).
47. Id.
48. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC,
2014 WL 12837397 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 7:14-cv-00180-BR).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Anne Blythe, Jury Awards Hog Farm Neighbors $50 Million, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Apr. 26, 2018, 07:25 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article209927914.
html; see also Ned Barnett, Opinion, N.C. Hog Industry Gets a Whiff of Odor’s Cost – $50
million. Will It Clean Up Now?, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 1, 2018, 03:57 PM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article210207404.html.
52. Anne Blythe, Jury Awards Hog Farm Neighbors $50 Million, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Apr. 26, 2018, 07:25 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article209927914.
html.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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In reinforcing their nuisance argument, the plaintiffs acquired several
experts to establish the farms’ interference with their quality of life. These
experts specialized in research on CAFOs and their impact on public health.55
In addition to providing testimony from public health professionals,
plaintiffs from each lawsuit underwent testing of their homes for a bacterium
called Pig2Bac, a microbe native to swine that is excreted with hog feces.56
The testing and report was done by Dr. Shane Rogers, a professor at
Clarkston University who previously worked alongside the Environmental
Protection Agency.57 Of the seventeen homes tested, fourteen tested positive
for the bacterium.58 In his report on this study, Dr. Rogers stated that “[i]t is
far more likely than not that hog feces also gets inside the clients[’] homes
where they live and where they eat.”59
In April 2018, the first verdict in this series of lawsuits was rendered.60 The
jury awarded the plaintiffs $50 million, a mixture of both compensatory and
punitive damages.61 However, in order to comply with the damage caps that
the North Carolina General Assembly has imposed on farm nuisance suits, 62
55. See Declaration of Shane Rogers, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2017 WL 9910608
(E.D.N.C. 2017), (No. 714CV00180); see also Deposition of Dr. Viney P. Aneja, Ph.D.,
McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2017 WL 9887574 (E.D.N.C. 2017), (No. 714CV00180);
Expert Report of Dr. Kendall Thu, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2017 WL 9910603
(E.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 714CV00180); Before Trial Video Deposition of Steve Wing, Ph.D.,
McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 2016 WL 11418466 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (Nos. 5:15-CV-000013BR, 7:14-cv-00183-BR, 7:14-cv-0023-BR, 7:14-cv-00185-BR, 7:14-cv-00182-BR, 7:14-cv00180-BR).
56. Catherine Clabby, The Science of Hog Farm Odors, N.C. HEALTH NEWS (June 25, 2018),
https://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2018/06/25/the-science-of-hog-farm-odors/.
57. Id.
58. Alex Formuzis, Ignoring Findings, State Lawmakers Look to Shield Big Pork From
Liability, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP (May 11, 2017), https://www.ewg.org/release/study-fecalbacteria-nc-hog-farms-infects-nearby-homes#.WyzeAS-ZOjQ.
59. Id.
60. Homeowners Receive $50M for Hog Farm Nuisance, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC,
No. 7:14CV00180 (E.D.N.C. 2018), 2018 WL 4582665.
61. Id.
62. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-702(a) (2018) (capping compensatory damages for a
permanent nuisance at the fair market value of the property and capping compensatory
damages for a temporary nuisance at the diminution in the fair rental value of the property);
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-702(a1) (2018) (removing the ability to recover punitive
damages where the “nuisance emanated from an agricultural or forestry operation that has not
been subject to a criminal conviction or a civil enforcement action taken by a State or federal
environmental regulatory agency”).
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the judge reduced the $50 million to $3.25 million.63 In June 2018, the second
verdict in this series of lawsuits was rendered.64 The jury awarded the
plaintiffs more than $25 million in damages.65 In August 2018, the third
verdict in this series of lawsuits was rendered, and the jury awarded the
plaintiffs $473.5 million in damages.66 Each plaintiff received between $3
million and $5 million in compensatory damages, and the jury awarded $75
million in punitive damages to each plaintiff.67 The verdict was capped and
remitted to $94 million.68 The fourth verdict in this series came in December
2018.69 This verdict carried no punitive damages, and the jury awarded each
of the neighbors between $100 and $75,000.70
D.

Big Pork’s Marketing: Community Response to Nuisance Lawsuits
Against Farmers

The summer of 2018 aimed the spotlight on North Carolina agriculture.
During the course of a few months, several verdicts against Murphy-Brown,
Inc., a subsidiary of Smithfield Foods, were handed down, and North
Carolina lawmakers responded with an amendment to the North Carolina
Right-to-farm Act.71 The response of lawmakers was spurred not only by
their own disagreement with the court decisions but by the strong reaction
of their constituents.72 Following the decisions, North Carolinians began to
63. Anne Blythe, Jury Awards Hog Farm Neighbors $50 Million. A Judge Reduced the Award
Dramatically., NEWS & OBSERVER (May 9, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/busin
ess/article210747979.html.
64. Homeowners Received $12.1M for Hog Farm Nuisance, McGowen v. Murphy-Brown,
LLC, No. 7:14CV00182 (E.D.N.C. 2018), 2018 WL 4859109.
65. Id.
66. Travis Fain, Jury Awards $473.5 Million to Neighbors Who Sued Smithfield Over Hog
Waste, WRAL (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.wral.com/third-hog-trial-to-jury-plaintiffs-askfor-millions/17743873/.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Andrew M. Ballardin & Steven M. Sellers, No Punitive Damages in Latest Hog Farm
Odor Lawsuit (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 13, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/X5MJH87G000000?bna_news_filter=true&jcsearch=BNA%252000000167a7b9d7
d0a5fff7bf93400000#jcite.
70. Id.
71. See discussion infra Part II.E.
72. Cole Villena, Big Pork Rallies as the General Assembly Protects Chinese-Owned
Smithfield Foods From Nuisance Lawsuits, INDYWEEK (June 27, 2018, 10:28 AM),
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show their support for the farmers through rallies and demonstrations, as
well as by posting signs on their lawns.73 This reaction may be attributed to
the pork industry’s portrayal of these lawsuits to the public.74 The rallies,
some of which took place at a hog farm and some of which took place in the
state capital, framed the issue as an attack on family farms.75 The signs in local
yards read, “Stand Up for NC Farm Families” and “Stop Complaining or Put
Down the Bacon.”76 The content of the rallies and the signs, however,
misinterpreted the situation. These lawsuits targeted Murphy-Brown, not the
local farmers. Additionally, politicians continually referred to the hog
neighbor’s attorneys as “out-of-state lawyers” in an attempt to garner
sympathy for the local farmers.77 It is this public relations strategy which
helped spawn the 2018 amendment to North Carolina’s Right-to-farm Act.
The Legislative Action in the Wake of the Murphy-Brown Litigation

E.

In 1979, the North Carolina legislature adopted its first right-to-farm act. 78
The stated purpose at that time was to “reduce the loss to the State of its
agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which agricultural
operations may be deemed to be a nuisance.”79 This limitation was said to be
imposed in order to “conserve and protect and encourage the development
and improvement of its agriculture land for the production of food and other
agricultural products.”80 The current version of this stated purpose has only
slightly changed in that it now explicitly includes forestry operations;
however, the same general intent remains: limit the circumstances in which

https://indyweek.com/news/archives/big-pork-rallies-general-assembly-protects-chineseowned-smithfield-foods-nuisance-lawsuits/.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., The Hog Nuisance Trials: A Summary, N.C. FARM FAM. (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.ncfarmfamilies.com/farmkeepersblog/2018/08/29/the-hog-nuisance-trials-asummary.
75. Charlotte Harris, ‘Traffic Jam’ at Duplin County Hog Farm as Rally Pushes Back on
Neighbors’ Lawsuits, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 10, 2018, 10:12 PM), https://www.newsobserver
.com/news/politics-government/article214649640.html; Villena, supra note 72.
76. Villena, supra note 72.
77. Id.
78. See Smart, supra note 14, at 2099.
79. Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140-41 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2020)).
80. Id.
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nuisance suits may be brought in order to protect agricultural operations.81
This overarching purpose is generally shared among many states. 82
The typical right-to-farm statute contains some provision for the “coming
to the nuisance” defense.83 This defense provides that farms cannot be subject
to liability for “becom[ing] a nuisance” because of a change in the
surrounding locality.84 Providing this defense for farmers was the primary
reason many states enacted right-to-farm statutes during the 1970s and
1980s.85 During this period, lands which were formerly agricultural rural
areas began experiencing increased urbanization with the rise of suburban
homes.86 In an effort to protect farmers from potential nuisance liability,
many states began enacting “right-to-farm” laws with provisions stating that
farm operations shall not “be or become a nuisance . . . by any changed
conditions in or about the locality outside of the operation.”87 In fact, prior
to the 2018 amendment, North Carolina’s right-to-farm act mirrored that
language.88 The 2013 version of North Carolina’s right-to-farm statute read:
No agricultural or forestry operation or any of its
appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance, private or
public, by any changed conditions in or about the locality
outside of the operation after the operation has been in
operation for more than one year, when such operation was
not a nuisance at the time the operation began.89
This language reflected the main purpose for which the legislature adopted
the right-to-farm: protecting farmers from nuisance liability as a result of
changes in their locality.90 In fact, the 1979 North Carolina Right-to-farm Act
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020).
82. See Smart, supra note 14, at 2099.
83. Id. at 2100.
84. Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140-41 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2020)).
85. See Smart, supra note 14, at 2099.
86. Id. at 2116.
87. Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-59
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020)).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2018).
89. Id.
90. Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-59 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2013)).
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noted this as one of its purposes by observing in its declaration of policy that
“[w]hen nonagricultural land uses extend into agricultural areas, agricultural
operations often become the subject of nuisance suits.”91
The provision for the “coming to the nuisance” defense through the
“changed conditions” language did more than protect farmers from nuisance
liability; it preserved a method of recourse for plaintiffs when a nuisance
came to them. For example, in McKiver, the plaintiffs had lived on the
properties for decades prior to the establishment of the farm. That fact
provided their cases the ability to avoid being precluded by statute.92
However, in 2018, the North Carolina General Assembly directly
responded to the multitude of lawsuits filed against Murphy-Brown, LLC and
amended the North Carolina Right-to-farm Act to remove any language
regarding “changed conditions in the locality.”93 Senate Bill 711 cited the
reason for the Bill, stating that “frivolous nuisance lawsuits” were forcing the
State to “make plain [the legislature’s] intent that existing farms . . . in North
Carolina that are operating in good faith be shielded from nuisance lawsuits
filed long after the operations [were] established.”94 The General Assembly
also specifically cited the recent suits against Murphy-Brown, LLC, stating
that “recently a federal trial court incorrectly and narrowly interpreted the
North Carolina Right-to-farm Act in a way that contradicts the intent of the
General Assembly.”95 This statement suggests that it is the General
Assembly’s intent that this Act be interpreted broadly to offer farms
maximum protection from nuisance liability. Following the 2018
amendment, North Carolina’s Right-to-farm Act now reads:
No nuisance action may be filed against an agricultural or
forestry operation unless all of the following apply:
(1) The plaintiff is a legal possessor of the real property
affected by the conditions alleged to be a nuisance.
91. Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140-41 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-700 (2020)).
92. Third Amended Complaint at 80, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 7:14-cv00180-BR (E.D.N.C. 2018), 2018 WL 4189408.
93. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020), with Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §
106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-59 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701
(2013)).
94. S. 711, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018).
95. Id.
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(2) The real property affected by the conditions alleged to
be a nuisance is located within one half-mile of the source of
the activity or structure alleged to be a nuisance.
(3) The action is filed within one year of the establishment
of the agricultural or forestry operation or within one year
of the operation undergoing a fundamental change.96
This revised language only permits plaintiffs who have had a nuisance come
to them a mere year to file a lawsuit, or otherwise lose the opportunity.
F.

The Governor Veto and Its Override

On June 15, 2018, the North Carolina General Assembly presented the
right-to-farm amendment to Governor Roy Cooper.97 On June 25, 2018,
Governor Cooper returned his veto of the bill.98 In his veto message,
Governor Cooper stated that the laws of North Carolina “must balance the
needs of businesses versus property rights. Giving one industry special
treatment at the expense of its neighbors is unfair.”99 The Governor also
referenced the infamous Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) case in which he,
as Attorney General of North Carolina, represented the state in a nuisance
claim against TVA based on the air pollution that the company was pumping
into the North Carolina mountains.100
On June 26, 2018, the North Carolina State Senate met to discuss the
Governor’s veto and the possibility of overriding his veto.101 In a 37–9 vote,
the Senate voted to override Governor Cooper’s veto of the 2018 Farm Bill.102
The bill then made its way to the House of Representatives.
On June 27, 2018, the North Carolina House of Representatives met to
discuss overriding Governor Cooper’s veto of the 2018 Farm Bill.103 In a 74–
45 vote, the House of Representatives joined the Senate in voting to override

96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020).
97. S. 711, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018).
98. ROY COOPER, GOVERNOR ROY COOPER OBJECTIONS AND VETO MESSAGE, (June 25, 2018).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Senate Bill 711, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookup/2017/s711
(last visited Mar. 5, 2020).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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the Governor’s veto.104 Following the override, the 2018 Farm Bill was
ratified, thus amending the North Carolina Right-to-farm Act.105
G.

Problems with the Current Language of the Statute

As mentioned above, the current language of the statute states that a
person may bring an action in nuisance if they fit the specified criteria. One
of the three listed criteria is that the plaintiff must file the action “within one
year of the establishment of the agricultural or forestry operation or within
one year of the operation undergoing a fundamental change.” 106 The General
Assembly then defined “fundamental change” in the negative, saying that it
is not “[a] change in ownership or size,” “[a]n interruption of farming for a
period of no more than three years,” “[p]articipation in a governmentsponsored agricultural program,” “[e]mployment of new technology,” or a
“[c]hange in type of agricultural or forestry product produced.”107 This
definition in the negative poses a few issues for those interpreting and
applying the statute.
The statute states that a fundamental change is not a “change in type of
agricultural or forestry product produced.”108 Read plainly, this provision
means that a farm may change from producing crops to producing hogs
without having to worry about its neighbors holding it liable for its newly
generated nuisance. This provision seems to overrule the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina’s decision in Durham v. Britt.109 In Britt, the plaintiff and his
wife built a home and later purchased the property across the road.110 At the
time that the plaintiff purchased that property, the defendant operated three
turkey houses on the eastern border of the property.111 The defendant had
been operating his farm for over twenty years when the plaintiff purchased
the adjoining property.112 A couple of years after the plaintiff had purchased
the property, the defendant wrote the plaintiff a letter telling of his intent to
construct and operate a hog farm on his own land and requesting access to
104. Id.
105. S. 711, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2018).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a)(3) (2020).
107. Id. at (a1).
108. Id. at (a1)(5).
109. Durham v. Britt, 451 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
110. Id. at 1.
111. Id.
112. Id.

342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd 143

5/14/20 9:43 AM

584

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

the road adjoining their properties.113 The plaintiff never responded to this
letter.114 The plaintiff brought a nuisance action against the defendant, and
the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the
defendant based upon the right-to-farm act.115 On appeal, the plaintiff argued
that the Act did not apply to his case because “no nuisance existed until
defendant Britt fundamentally changed the nature of the agricultural activity
occurring on his property by constructing a high-volume commercial swine
facility.”116 Based upon this argument, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the statutory immunity
provided by the right-to-farm act did not apply in this instance. 117
While the holding in Britt makes logical sense, the language of the statute
demonstrates that the legislature would have agreed with the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment. While the statute uses the same language,
“fundamental change,” that was used in Britt, its use runs counter to the
statutory reference to the case by including a provision that contradicts the
case’s outcome. The court in Britt found that, “[c]ertainly, in the instant case,
a fundamental change has occurred where defendant, who previously
operated turkey houses, has decided to change his farming operation to that
of a hog production facility.”118 Now, the statute allows for such a
fundamental change and expressly states that a fundamental change is not “a
change in the type of agricultural or forestry product produced.”119 Thus,
under the current statute, a court would have to affirm the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment, unless that court narrowly construed the term
“product.”
Second, the statute states that a fundamental change is not “[a]n
interruption of farming for a period of no more than three years.” 120 This
provision carries a new weight when considered in conjunction with the
removal of the Act’s “changed conditions in the locality” provision. The
changed conditions in the locality provision was a remnant of the coming to
the nuisance defense. It provided that no agricultural or forestry operation
113. Id. at 1–2.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Durham, 451 S.E.2d at 2.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 4.
118. Id.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a1) (2020).
120. Id.
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“shall be or become a nuisance . . . by any changed conditions in or about the
locality outside of the operation after the operation has been in operation for
more than one year, when the operation was not a nuisance at the time the
operation began.”121 This provision was removed from the latest version of
the Act. This suggests that someone who has moved next door to the farm
following the farm’s establishment would be able to bring a nuisance suit if
the operation were to undergo a fundamental change.122 However, with the
removal of one barrier to justice, another is built. With the operations being
permitted to have an interruption of farming, meaning no farming is
conducted, for a period of up to three years, a party may take possession of
the land during that interruption and have no redress when the farm reboots
operation two years later.
The third major issue with the negative definition of “fundamental
change” is that a “fundamental change” does not include a change in size.123
This is especially troubling in the era of CAFOs. Under the current language
of the statute, a smaller farm with 200 hogs could contract with MurphyBrown, LLC, and begin housing 1,000 hogs without constituting a
fundamental change. Thus, if such an occurrence were to happen, the
neighbors of the farm would be burdened with the increased smell and
swarms of flies without having an outlet of redress for their injuries.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH RESTRICTIVE RIGHT-TO-FARM ACTS
The right-to-farm has arisen out of a justified need to protect America’s
farmers from economic destruction at the hands of their neighbors. The
societal need for the agricultural industry further supports the
implementation of the right-to-farm. However, implementing a right-tofarm magnifies the need to ensure the protection of property rights for farm
neighbors. The primary purpose of nuisance law is to protect the right to use
and enjoy one’s property. In adopting and ratifying the right-to-farm, most
states implemented the typical “coming to the nuisance” defense that revokes
121. Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, § 106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-59
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020)).
122. This is because the only three requirements for standing are that the plaintiff? is the
“legal possessor of the real property affected by the conditions alleged to be a nuisance,” that
the affected property be “located within one half-mile of the source of the activity or structure
alleged to be a nuisance,” and that the “action be filed within one year of the establishment of
the . . . operation or within one year of the operation undergoing a fundamental change.” See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2020).
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a property owner’s nuisance claim where the owner moved next door to the
purported nuisance (i.e., the farm). This decision resulted from a balancing
of interests. In the eyes of the lawmakers, it seemed just to protect farmers
from potential litigation where a neighbor “came to the nuisance.” Similarly,
it seemed fair and equitable to disallow a nuisance claim where the party
bringing the action is responsible for the complained injury. For these
reasons, the “coming to the nuisance” defense has persisted and should
persist within right-to-farm acts.
With the birth of the right-to-farm, lobbyists began pushing the General
Assembly for further protections from nuisance litigation. These additional
protections came in the form of additional criteria that plaintiffs must satisfy
for their action to survive a motion to dismiss. In North Carolina, these
criteria include provisions requiring the action to be filed within one year of
a new operation’s establishment or within one year of a fundamental change
to an existing operation.124 Though the act does not define a fundamental
change, it explains that a fundamental change is not a change in size or
product type.125 While these provisions further the state’s interest in shielding
agricultural operations from nuisance liability, the strictness of the criteria
and the narrow definition, or definition by broad exclusion, of what
constitutes a fundamental change functions contrary to the interest of
preserving property rights. With the rise of CAFOs, strict restrictions upon
nuisance claims create problems for property owners. These problems
include the infringement upon property rights guaranteed by both the state
and federal Constitutions, the health issues arising from current farming
methods, and the disincentive to solve these issues.
A.

Infringement upon Property Rights: Revoking the Right to Use and
Enjoy Property

The right to use and enjoy one’s property has been recognized since the
days of Blackstone. Indeed, Sir William Blackstone acknowledged this right
in the chapter “Of Nuisance” within his Commentaries on the Laws of
England. In that chapter, Blackstone states, “if a person keeps his hogs . . . so
near the house of another that the stench of them incommodes him and
makes the air unwholesome, this is an injurious nuisance, as it tends to

124. Id.
125. Id.
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deprive him of the use and benefit of his house.”126 This right to use and enjoy
one’s property has long been considered one of the sticks in the bundle of
property rights.127 This bundle of rights creates the legal understanding of
property as a collection of rights rather than merely possession of land. Thus,
because property is observed by the law as a collection of rights, infringement
upon any of those rights creates an infringement upon one’s property.
Additionally, the North Carolina Supreme Court has adopted this view by
recognizing that “‘[p]roperty’ . . . includes ‘not only the thing possessed
but . . . the right of the owner to the land; the right to possess, use, enjoy and
dispose of it, and the corresponding right to exclude others from its use.’” 128
1.

The Example of Iowa: From Gacke to Honomichl

In 2004, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the state’s statutory grant of
nuisance immunity to animal feeding operations violated the Iowa
Constitution to the extent that it deprived the plaintiffs of “a remedy for the
taking of their property resulting from a nuisance created by an animal
feeding operation.”129 Though this decision is not binding on North Carolina
courts, it is highly persuasive considering the level of prominence that
farming has in the Iowa economy compared to that of the North Carolina
economy.130 As stated above, Iowa is the only state in the nation that produces
more hogs than North Carolina.131
The Gackes lived across the road from two hog buildings, both owned and
operated by the defendant, Pork Xtra, L.L.C. The operation was established
in 1996 and the Gackes had lived at that location since 1974.132 The Gackes
filed an action claiming that the operation was a nuisance, citing their injuries
of emotional distress and the decrease in the value of their property.133 The
farm attempted to claim immunity under Iowa’s right-to-farm statute, but

126. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217.
127. Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 252–53
(2007).
128. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 786 S.E.2d 919, 924 (N.C. 2016) (quoting Hildebrand
v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1941)).
129. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 2004).
130. Liggett, supra note 3, at 28.
131. See discussion supra Part II; see also Liggett, supra note 3, at 28.
132. Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 171.
133. Id.
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the court denied its claim because it viewed the immunity as an
unconstitutional taking.134
In support of its holding, the court cited one of its previous decisions,
Bormann v. Board of Supervisors in and for Kossuth County. In Bormann, the
Kossuth County Board of Supervisors had approved the application of
landowners to declare an agricultural area within the county.135 Their
approval gave the applicants statutory nuisance immunity.136 The neighbors
of the applicants challenged this declaration, and the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that the statute’s grant of nuisance immunity created “an easement in
the property affected by the nuisance . . . in favor of the applicants’
land . . . because the immunity allows the applicants to do acts on their own
land which, were it not for the easement, would constitute a nuisance.”137 In
Bormann, the court concluded that “such ‘[e]asements are property interests
subject to the just compensation requirements of the Fifth
Amendment . . . and [the Iowa] Constitution.’”138 The Gacke court found
Bormann controlling and affirmed the lower court’s application of Bormann
in holding Iowa’s right-to-farm statute created an unconstitutional taking. 139
The defendant in Gacke argued that the court should overrule Bormann
because it applied a per se takings analysis rather than the Penn Central
balancing test140 for regulatory takings. The Gacke court, however, declined
to retreat from its holding in Bormann, stating that the “ultimate conclusion
was simply that the immunity statute created an easement and the
appropriation of this property right was a taking.”141 The court was not
interested in parsing words to determine whether the taking was regulatory
or per se; it simply found that a taking had occurred because an easement was
created.142
134. Id. at 172–73.
135. Id. at 172.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1998))
(omissions in original).
138. Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316) (alterations and
omissions in original).
139. Id. at 173, 185.
140. See generally BRIAN W. BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AVOIDING
INVITATIONS TO ABUSE DISCRETION § 1:21 (database updated Aug. 2019).
141. Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 173.
142. Id. at 173–74.
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After finding that a taking had occurred, the Iowa court turned to the issue
of whether the taking was a valid exercise of the state’s police power; it held
that it was not. The court found that the statutory nuisance immunity
constituted an “oppressive exercise of the state’s police power.”143 The court
noted that it is “important in substantive due process analysis to consider
whether the effect of a statute is ‘to give an injured person, in essence, no right
of recovery.’”144 The court noted that the Gackes bore the burden of the
statute’s “undesirable impact” without a “corresponding benefit” and the
statute deprived them of any remedy for their injury.145 The court
summarized the situation by stating that “one property owner—the
producer—is given the right to use his property without due regard for the
personal and property rights of his neighbor.”146 The court held that such a
situation resulted in an unduly oppressive exercise of the state’s police
power.147
In 2018, the Supreme Court of Iowa discussed the application of the Gacke
factors.148 In this decision, the court identified the procedural options
available to Iowa courts as they balance the Gacke factors with the legislative
purpose of the right-to-farm.149 This procedure would unfold as follows: the
CAFOs would be allowed to plead the right-to-farm as an affirmative defense,
then the plaintiffs would be required to show that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to them through proving the Gacke factors.150
In Honomichl, the defendants were Valley View Swine, LLC, and JBS Live
Pork, LLC.151 The defendants partnered together to establish CAFOs at two
locations in Wapello County, Iowa.152 The plaintiffs were owners of real estate
located near the defendants’ CAFOs and alleged that the CAFOs constituted
a nuisance because of “the odors, pathogens, and flies” that emanated from

143. Id. at 185.
144. Id. at 179 (quoting Shearer v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 236 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Iowa
1975)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 179.
148. Honomichl v. Valley View Swine, LLC, 914 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 2018).
149. Id. at 238.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 227.
152. Id.
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the farms.153 The district court then split the case into three divisions based
upon the allegations against the different defendants.154 The Division A
plaintiffs filed an amended petition claiming “temporary nuisance,
permanent nuisance, and negligence.”155 The defendants answered the
complaint alleging Iowa’s right-to-farm statute as an affirmative defense.156
Following the initial pleadings, the court allowed the plaintiffs and
defendants to choose two plaintiff households for separate bellwether trials
to occur in the different divisions.157
In all the divisions, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment
alleging that the right-to-farm provided them with statutory immunity to the
plaintiffs’ claims.158 On the same day that the defendants filed their motions
for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, requesting that the court declare the statutory immunity defense
unconstitutional as applied to their case.159 The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all permanent nuisance
claims but granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment in
Division A.160 Thus, the court declared that the statute was unconstitutional
as applied to the Division A plaintiffs.161 The defendants appealed, arguing
that the district court erred in granting the plaintiffs’ motion and finding that
the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the Division A plaintiffs.162
Specifically, the defendants alleged that the district court improperly applied
the Gacke holding without making specific factual findings.163 The Supreme
Court of Iowa agreed with the defendants, and reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings.164 The court concluded that “[w]ithout this factbased analysis, we are unable to resolve this issue on this record.”165
153. Id. at 226.
154. Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 228.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 228–29.
157. Id. at 229.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 229.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 230.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 238.
165. Id. at 227.
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The Supreme Court of Iowa began its analysis of the situation by
distinguishing between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges. 166 It
noted that facial challenges are those in which “no application of the statute
could be constitutional under any set of facts.”167 However, “an as-applied
challenge alleges the statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular set
of facts.”168 In Gacke, the court found Iowa’s Right-to-farm statute
unconstitutional as applied.169 After noting the distinction between facial and
as-applied constitutional challenges, the court reviewed its analysis in
Gacke.170
The court began its review of Gacke by discussing Iowa’s inalienable rights
clause, stating, “This provision protects ‘pre-existing common law’ property
rights from ‘arbitrary restrictions.’”171 This protection is subject to
“reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power.”172 The
court’s analysis then began to mirror the North Carolina takings analysis
presented below. The court’s analytical framework, like the North Carolina
takings analysis, is split into two steps.173 First, it must appear that the public
interest requires state interference with the individual’s right.174 Second, the
means of accomplishing the purpose must be “reasonably necessary” and not
“unduly oppressive upon individuals.”175 The similarities between North
Carolina’s takings analysis and Iowa’s inalienable rights clause framework
end in applying this second step of analysis.176 That is because in applying the
second step of the analysis, Iowa courts must apply Gacke’s three-prong
test.177 This test states:

166. Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 231.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 234.
170. Id. at 235–37.
171. Id. at 235 (citing May’s Drug Stores v. State Tax Comm’n, 45 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Iowa
1950)).
172. Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 235 (quoting Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168,
176 (Iowa 2004)).
173. Id. (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136–37 (1984)).
174. Id. (citing Lawton, 152 U.S. at 136–37).
175. Id. (quoting Lawton, 152 U.S. at 136–37).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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[P]laintiffs must show they (1) receive[d] no particular
benefit from the nuisance immunity granted to their
neighbors other than that inuring to the public in general[,]
(2) sustain[ed] significant hardship[,] and (3) resided on
their property long before any animal operation was
commenced on neighboring land and had spent
considerable sums of money in improvements to their
property prior to construction of the defendant’s facilities.178
The court in Honomichl noted that in Gacke, it found the statute
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs because of the way their specific
circumstances affected the application of this test.179
After reviewing its decision in Gacke, the court considered the changes
that the industry had undergone and the significant regulatory schemes that
had been enacted since Gacke was decided.180 Despite these changes, the court
reaffirmed the Gacke test as the standard for analyzing as-applied
constitutional challenges to the Iowa Right-to-farm Act.181
The court in Honomichl explained that the Gacke factors could not be
decided at the summary judgment stage because each of the factors is
“dependent upon the genuine issues of material fact of each case.”182 It
stressed this finding by referring to the Gacke test as the “fact-specific
enterprise of balancing of interests.”183 Although it would not permit the asapplied constitutional challenge to be resolved at the summary judgment
stage, the court specifically noted that the challenge could be resolved in
pretrial litigation.184 However, the proper application of the test is to:
[A]llow the CAFOs to plead [the right-to-farm] as an
affirmative defense to the claims, if applicable.
Correspondingly, the plaintiffs claiming [the right-to-farm]
is unconstitutional as applied to them must prove the factors
178. Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gacke v.
Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 178 (Iowa 2004)) (alterations in original).
179. Id. at 235–36.
180. Id. at 236–37.
181. Id. at 237.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 238 (quoting Dalarna Farms v. Access Energy Coop., 792 N.W.2d 656 (Iowa
2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Honomichl, 914 N.W.2d at 238.
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set forth in Gacke. After the parties have submitted their
proof, the court can then determine the constitutionality of
[the right-to-farm] as applied to particular plaintiffs.185
The court could make this determination in a pretrial hearing which would
allow the court to “properly balance the Gacke factors with the legislative
purpose of the statute to protect and promote animal agriculture in the
state.”186 The court in Honomichl concluded that the district court erred by
declaring the statute unconstitutional as applied to Division A plaintiffs
“without the benefit of specific fact-finding.”187
Gacke provides an example of how a court might resolve the injustice
created by application of the right-to-farm’s statutory nuisance immunity; it
provides excellent reasoning for finding that a right-to-farm statute can
constitute a taking and that provisions for nuisance immunity tend to create
easements.
2.

The North Carolina Takings Clause Analysis

In North Carolina, the “fundamental right to property is as old as [the]
state.”188 Although the state constitution does not contain an express takings
provision, “the fundamental right to just compensation [i]s so grounded in
natural law and justice that it is considered an integral part of the law of the
land within the meaning of Article I, Section 19 of our [North Carolina]
Constitution.”189 North Carolina, through its takings jurisprudence, has
defined a taking as “the taking of something, whether it is the actual physical
property or merely the right of ownership, use or enjoyment.” 190 Here, there
is an obvious impact upon property rights. The use and enjoyment of
property is an interest in property, the taking of which is compensable under

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 786 S.E.2d 919, 923 (N.C. 2016) (citing eighteenth
century legal and political documents).
189. Id. at 924 (quoting Long v. City of Charlotte, 293 S.E.2d 101, 107–08 (N.C. 1982))
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 769 S.E.2d 218, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting S.
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hous. Auth., 247 S.E.2d 663, 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)).
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the state takings doctrine.191 However, the takings inquiry does not end at
determining impact upon property rights.
After determining an impact, if any, upon property rights, the court will
then ask whether the state’s act is an exercise of its police powers or of
eminent domain.192 The government uses its police power to regulate
property to “prevent injury to the public.”193 Such regulations “must be
enacted in good faith, and ha[ve] appropriate and direct connection with that
protection to life, health, and property which each State owes to her
citizens.”194 In contrast, the government uses its power of eminent domain to
take property “for public use because such action is advantageous or
beneficial to the public.”195 A taking may last for a limited period or
indefinitely. As such, a taking may take the form of “an easement, a mere
limited use, . . . [or] an absolute, unqualified fee.”196 “The state must
compensate for property rights taken by eminent domain; damages resulting
from the exercise of the police power are noncompensable.”197 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals has drawn the distinction between the exercise of
police powers and eminent domain in relation to the use and enjoyment of
property. In Kirby, the court stated that “[i]n the exercise of eminent
domain[,] property or an easement therein is taken from the owner and
applied to public use because the use or enjoyment of such property or
easement therein is beneficial to the public.”198 In contrast, “[i]n the exercise
191. See Long, 293 S.E.2d at 109 (stating that for a taking to occur, “there need only be a
substantial interference with elemental rights growing out of the ownership of the property”);
see also Ivester v. City of Winston-Salem, 1 S.E.2d 88, 88, 90 (1939) (holding odors, smoke,
ashes, rats, and mosquitoes and other insects from a sewage disposal plant to be a taking); Gray
v. City of High Point, 166 S.E. 911, 913 (N.C. 1932) (holding odors from an adjacent sewage
disposal plant to be a taking); Hines v. City of Rocky Mount, 78 S.E. 510, 511 (N.C. 1913)
(holding odors from a nearby trash dump to be a taking).
192. Kirby, 786 S.E.2d at 924.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting City of Durham v. Eno Cotton Mills, 54 S.E. 453, 462 (N.C. 1906))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 295 (quoting Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 112 S.E.2d 111,
113 (N.C. 1960)) (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Barnes v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n, 126 S.E.2d 732, 738 (N.C. 1962) (quoting State
v. Fox, 332 P.2d 943, 946 (Wash. 1958)).
198. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 769 S.E.2d 218, 230 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting
Durham, 54 S.E. at 462) (second alteration in original).
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of the police power[,] the owner is denied the unrestricted use or enjoyment
of his property, or his property is taken from him because his use or
enjoyment of such property is injurious to the public welfare.”199
The North Carolina Right-to-farm Act constitutes an unconstitutional
taking without just compensation as applied to neighbors of CAFOs. First,
there is an impact upon the neighbors’ property rights. As stated above,
property rights include the right to use and enjoy one’s property. Such
interest is taken from neighbors of CAFOs through the offensive odors and
influx of flies. Some individuals have described the horrible smell that settles
in their hair and clothes, following them all day.200 Others tell of how they
cannot go outside because the odor induces nausea and makes them sick.201
In addition to these reactions to the odor, a researcher at Duke University
has found that people living near hog CAFOs “showed ‘more tension,
depression, more anger, less vigor, more fatigue and more confusion’ than
others.”202 These testimonials indicate the negative impact that CAFOs have
on their neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their property, and establishes a
basis for damages.
The next step of the North Carolina takings analysis is to analyze whether
the Right-to-farm Act is an exercise of the state’s police powers or of eminent
domain. As stated above, an exercise of a police power must have an
“appropriate and direct connection” to the protection of life, health, or
property, which the state owes to its citizens. The right-to-farm is not such a
protection. Viewing the act in the light most favorable to the government, the
Right-to-farm Act protects the North Carolina economy. However,
protection of the economy is not an enumerated interest and thus constitutes
“[a]n exercise of police power outside of these bounds[, which] may result in
a taking.”203
After determining that the right-to-farm does not constitute an exercise of
the police power, the analysis then asks whether it is an exercise of eminent
domain. Here, the right-to-farm is an exercise of eminent domain as applied
to CAFO neighbors because the nuisance immunity provision is a
governmental action which “takes property for public use because such
199. Id. (quoting Durham, 54 S.E. at 462) (second alteration in original).
200. DAVID KIRBY, ANIMAL FACTORY: THE LOOMING THREAT OF INDUSTRIAL PIG, DAIRY,
AND POULTRY FARMS TO HUMANS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 89 (2010).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 90.
203. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 786 S.E.2d 919, 924 (N.C. 2016).
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action is advantageous or beneficial to the public.”204 The analogy to Gacke
applies here. Like the plaintiffs in Gacke, the neighbors of North Carolina
CAFOs also have had an easement created on their land through the statutory
immunity granted to CAFOs by the state. Like the statute in Gacke, the North
Carolina statute creates an easement because “the immunity allows the
[CAFOs] to do acts on their own land which, were it not for the easement,
would constitute a nuisance.”205 Thus, relying on the reasoning in Gacke, the
North Carolina Supreme Court should find that the North Carolina right-tofarm act constitutes an unconstitutional taking as applied to neighbors of
CAFOs.
3.

Due Process Jurisprudence

In addition to providing excellent reasoning for a takings analysis, Gacke
also hints that narrow provisions within right-to-farm acts may violate due
process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (the Due Process Clause) provides that “[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”206 The North Carolina constitution
provides a parallel provision in Article I Section 19, which states that “[n]o
person shall be . . . in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but
by the law of the land.”207 The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that
“[t]he term ‘law of the land’ as used in Article I, Section 19, of the
Constitution of North Carolina, is synonymous with ‘due process of law’ as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”208 Due
Process jurisprudence divides due process into two categories: substantive
due process and procedural due process.209 Substantive due process asks
whether there is a sufficient justification or purpose for the government’s
deprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or property.210 Procedural due process

204. Id.
205. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Iowa 2004).
206. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
207. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
208. State v. Williams, 761 S.E.2d 662, 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (alteration in original).
209. State v. Thompson, 508 S.E.2d 277, 282 (N.C. 1998).
210. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999).
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asks whether the government followed proper procedures when taking life,
liberty, or property.211 Here, substantive due process applies.
“‘Substantive due process’ protection prevents the government from
engaging in conduct that . . . interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’”212 It is a “guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
law be substantially related to the valid object sought to be obtained.”213
Essentially, substantive due process “protects the public from government
action that unreasonably deprives them of a liberty or property interest.”214
The first step in analyzing a substantive due process claim is to determine
the interest or right being invaded. The party seeking procedural protection
bears the burden of establishing that a life, liberty, or property interest is at
stake.215 If the right infringed upon is fundamental, then the court will apply
strict scrutiny, and the state must demonstrate “a compelling state interest
for the law to survive a constitutional attack.”216 If the interest is not
fundamental, then the court will apply the rational basis test, and “the
government action need only have a rational relation to a legitimate
governmental objective to pass constitutional muster.”217 To determine
whether a right is fundamental, the court must assess “whether it is
‘objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition or if it is
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’”218 A violation of substantive due process
may be claimed “any time the government takes away life, liberty or
property.”219 This is because “[a]ny time the government deprives a person of

211. Id.
212. Thompson, 508 S.E.2d at 282 (citations omitted).
213. State v. Joyner, 211 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 1975).
214. Tripp v. City of Winston-Salem, 655 S.E.2d 890, 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting
Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)).
215. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
216. Clark v. Sanger Clinic, 542 S.E.2d 668, 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
217. Tripp, 655 S.E.2d at 893 (quoting Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002)).
218. Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 730 (N.C. 2008) (quoting Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
219. Chemerinsky, supra note 210, at 1508.
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life, liberty or property, the government must provide a sufficient
justification.”220
A substantive due process issue arises in the context of the amended Act
and its provision of nuisance immunity. The right or interest being invaded
by the provision of statutory nuisance immunity for farmers is the right to
use and enjoy one’s property. The right to use and enjoy one’s property is a
fundamental property interest that is deeply rooted in the history and
tradition of the United States. This property interest has existed since the
time of Sir William Blackstone and is documented in his Commentaries on
the Laws of England.221 Additionally, the existence of nuisance as a cause of
action, specifically designed to protect the use and enjoyment of one’s
property, evidences the fundamental nature of the right in both the United
States and the State of North Carolina. Indeed, as demonstrated above, the
“fundamental right to property is as old as [the] state” and the term property
in North Carolina includes the use and enjoyment thereof. 222
Because the right to use and enjoy one’s property is a fundamental right,
the court must apply strict scrutiny in determining whether the deprivation
of it is adequately justified. Strict scrutiny requires the government to prove
that the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
interest.223 In this context, the interest that the state will likely claim will be
the economic benefit of shielding farms from nuisance liability, as well as the
purpose espoused in the Act. While this is a legitimate governmental interest,
the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve this end. As stated herein, there
are several issues with the language of the statute that could work an injustice
to the people of North Carolina.224 Because the statute is not narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling governmental interest, it will fail strict scrutiny.
It would be presumptuous to claim definitively how a court will decide this
argument. However, based on the sea of cases flowing out of the eastern
district of North Carolina, it is likely that the court will decide for the farm
neighbors. Regardless, a substantive due process claim would be a viable
alternative cause of action where a farm neighbor seeks to bring a nuisance
220. Id. at 1509.
221. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (“The third absolute right, inherent in
every Englishman, is that of property; which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal
of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”).
222. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 786 S.E.2d 919, 923 (N.C. 2016).
223. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (5th ed. 2016).
224. See discussion supra Part II.F.
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claim against a farm or agricultural producer because the statutory nuisance
immunity creates an easement on the neighbor’s property.
B.

Mitigating the Harm

If the courts fail to find the Right-to-farm Act unconstitutional based upon
the arguments herein, the North Carolina courts can still mitigate the
damages that the newly amended right-to-farm act will pose to its citizenry
by utilizing an undue burden standard for substantive due process and
finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to certain plaintiffs. By
following the example of Iowa, North Carolina courts can introduce pretrial
hearings to determine whether the statute should be applied in specific
situations. The purpose of these hearings will be to balance the interests of
the parties. Ideally, this balancing will take a form like the Gacke model,225 or
it could take the form of Restatement (2d) of Torts § 826.226 Either form
would allow the CAFOs to plead the right-to-farm as an affirmative defense,
then allow plaintiffs to counter that argument by showing that the application
of the statutory immunity would be unconstitutional as applied to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff can do this by showing the court the satisfaction of the
Gacke factors. The Gacke factors would serve best to balance the plaintiff’s
property interests and the state’s proposed interest in offering the statutory
immunity. This test would ensure that the statute applies to accomplish the
purpose of the General Assembly when the statutory immunity would not
unreasonably interfere with the rights of the farm neighbors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 2018 amendment to the North Carolina Right-to-farm Act drastically
limits the ability to bring a nuisance action against a farm. Its harsh
requirements make it nearly impossible to find a set of circumstances
whereby a potential plaintiff would be able to satisfy all of the listed criteria
and thus be able to bring a nuisance action.227 The espoused purpose for such
stringency is the protection and preservation of North Carolina farmers and
North Carolina’s agricultural resources.228 What the Act fails to consider is
that not all of North Carolina’s farms are small, family-owned operations. An
225. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (weighing the gravity of
the harm versus the utility of the conduct).
227. Id.
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (2020).
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increasing portion of the farms in North Carolina, and across the United
States, are shifting to the CAFO model and those operations that were once
family-owned now either have contracts with, or are owned by, large,
international corporations.229 With such change in the industry, North
Carolina lawmakers must adopt a change in policy; otherwise, farm
neighbors will be left to suffer deprivations of their property rights and
injuries to their health without compensation. Without reform, the cost of
maintaining a nuisance will be placed upon the farm neighbor, rather than
borne by the business itself or the consumer who “rightfully should pay for
the entire cost of producing the product he desires to obtain.”230
For the above reasons, the courts should either hold the statute facially
unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to certain plaintiffs.
Additionally, the North Carolina General Assembly should further amend
the statute to preclude CAFOs from receiving the benefits of nuisance
immunity. Finally, plaintiffs must work with their attorneys to seek
alternative sources of recovery for these injuries should the courts and the
legislature deny them with recourse for their injuries.

229. See Smart, supra note 14, at 2116.
230. Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 701 P.2d 222, 229 (Idaho 1985) (Bistline, J.,
dissenting).
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